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The Origins of Multinational Manufacturing
by Continental European Firms*
n European multinationals followed a different path of development from
that pursued by United States firms, but European multinational manu-
facturing began even earlier than did American, and its story is no less
significant. Dr. Franko offers a range of relevant data and analysis about
the evolution of direct foreign investment by Western European manu-
facturers.
Unlike its European counterpart, the origins of the spread
of U.S. multinational manufacturing enterprise are reasonably well
understood. It seems generally agreed that American firms started
down the road to multinational manufacturing because they had a
penchant for introducing new, labor-saving, highly income elastic
products; they specialized in what has come to be termed "product
pioneering." As innovators, they had proprietary knowledge of
the production of these goods, which were clearly differentiable
from other articles because of their novelty.1 Rising per capita in-
comes in Europe and elsewhere first pulled such new products into
those nations as exports.2 When income distributions in Europe
shifted toward the U.S. pattern, as they did in post-World War II
Britain, Sweden, and Holland, the pull was probably all the
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1
 In this paper, "innovation" refers to first commercial introduction, rather than first
invention of a product.
The relationship between differentiability of products and the spread of foreign manu-
facture "horizontally," i.e., in the same product lines, by U.S. firms, has been particularly
emphasized by Caves. See R. Caves, "International Corporations: The Industrial Eco-
nomics of Foreign Investment," Economica (February, 1971).
2
 Empirical evidence for this view of the causes of U.S. foreign investment is accu-
mulating at a rapid rate. For example, A. E. Scaperlanda and L. J. Maurer have shown
that changes in EEC market size, not trade barriers nor differential U.S.-EEC growth
rates were most closely correlated with the massive influx of American direct investment in
Europe between 1952 and 1966. See Scaperlanda and Maurer, "The Determinants of
U.S. Direct Investment in the EEC," American Economic Review (September 1969). See
also the evidence summarized in Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay (New York, 1971),
Chapter III.
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harder.3 The American Challenge thus met the European attraction,
most often in the form of foreign customers' requests.4
For American firms, the transition from exporting to foreign
manufacturing often came as non-American markets for new prod-
ucts became large enough and certain enough to warrant invest-
ments in additional plant capacity. Foreign production seemed in
order when scale economies in U.S. production were about to be
exhausted, when foreign production began to look as if it could
be undertaken for an average cost less than U.S. marginal cost
plus transport and tariffs, and when customer needs and produc-
tion techniques were standardized so that such costs could be cal-
culated. All these events inevitably occurred as new products went
from birth to maturity over their life cycles.5 They were hastened
by the fact that wage rates were almost invariably lower outside,
as opposed to inside the U.S. In such circumstances, even profit
maximizing firms with world-wide product monopolies had reason
to put up foreign plants. Conceptually, their decision was identical
to that of a domestic manufacturer considering expansion into a
less developed region of his home market. The evidence suggests,
however, that managers of few U.S. firms reasoned in quite such
a comfortable manner. The threat of losing established markets,
rather than opportunities offered by new ones, was the most fre-
quent trigger of foreign manufacturing investment.6 Even in the
early days of their international export expansion, most U.S. firms
were threatened by competition, either from local entrepreneurs
awakening to newly feasible production opportunities,7 or (more
importantly) from either potential or actual threatening moves by
American oligopolistic competitors.8
Much less is known about the evolution of European-based mul-
tinationals. Indeed, even the magnitude of those "other multina-
tionals" has often remained obscure. During the 1960s it was
3
 This hypothesis has been subjected to a very preliminary (although positive) test in
J. Neill Fortune, "Income Distribution as a Determinant of Imports of Manufactured Con-
sumer Commodities," Canadian Journal of Economics, V (May, 1972).
* The importance of foreign customers' requests as a factor pulling U.S. firms into
foreign markets has been repeatedly emphasized in surveys of motivations both for ex-
porting and for foreign manufacturing investments. H. J. Robinson, in The Motivation and
Flow of Foreign Private Investment (Stanford Research Institute, 1961), 37, notes that
over 90 per cent of external triggers for investment mentioned by U.S. firms in his survey
involved proposals by foreign industrialists.
5
 A further description of this process is given in Raymond Vemon, "International
Trade and International Investment in the Product Cycle," Chapter II of Sovereignty at Bay.8
 See Ibid., Chapter 3 for evidence on this point.
' Ibid.
8
 See Frederick T. Knickerbocker, Oligopolistic Reaction and Multinational Enterprise
(Boston, 1973), for statistical evidence. See also Mira Wilkins, The Maturing of Multina-
tional Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass., 1974) for historical material on specific firms.
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sometimes said that virtually all multinational enterprises were
American in origin.9 However, the historical record shows that
multinationality of manufacturing operations is no American mo-
nopoly.10 During the century and a half that has elapsed since
Cockerill of Belgium put up its first foreign plant in Prussia in
1815, the majority of today's large Western European companies
have come first to sell and then to produce outside their home
countries.
In 1970, seventy-eight of the eighty-one continental European
companies on the Fortune "200" list were manufacturing outside
their home countries. Even "domestic" coal and steel producers
such as Buderus'che, Salzgitter, Vallourec, and Charbonnages de
France, owned at least 25 per cent of one or more foreign manu-
facturing ventures in that year. Moreover, some sixty of the seventy-
one firms for which information is available derived 25 per cent or
more of their total sales from exports and foreign production in
1970.11
Already in 1960, thirty-four of the eighty-one large continental
firms owned manufacturing operations in seven or more countries.12
On the eves of World Wars 1 and II, the number of such firms, or
of their direct predecessors with a corresponding degree of multi-
nationality, had been seven and fourteen respectively. By 1970, no
fewer than sixty-two of the eighty-one European companies on the
Fortune "200" list had attained such a multinational spread. The
distribution of the continental companies by industry and by degree
of multinationality in 1970 is given in Table 1.
B
 Such at least was the implication most readers carried away from a reading of J. J.
Servan-Schreiber's famous statement that, after the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the third largest
producing unit in the world would soon consist of American subsidiaries abroad. The im-
pression was made all the stronger by chapter titles such as "Europe Without a Strategy"
and by sentences such as: "L'Europe n'a presque rien sur le plan industriel, de com-
parable aux entreprises a grande aire d'activit£ qui caract^risent les societ^s americaines
s'implantant sur son sol. Une exception interessante: L'Imperial Chemical Industries (An-
gletrre), seule compagnie europeenne qui ait organise un Itat-major a l'£chelon du conti-
nent pour prendre en main l'administration de ses cinquante filiales. Les efforts deployed
par quelques autres societes europeennes apparaissent timides." Servan-Schreiber, Le
Deft Amiricain (Paris, 1967), 20, emphasis added.
In 1969, Jack Behrman also appeared to underestimate the importance of European
companies' international operations: "If one postulates that the awakening point (of transi-
tion to multinational enterprise) occurs when foreign operations become something over
25 percent of total activity of the enterprise, there are close to 200 U.S.-based enterprises
which are candidates for becoming multinational — if they are not already in that category.
But, there are few European-based companies meeting the criterion." Behrman, Some
Patterns in the Rise of Multinational Enterprise (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1969).
10
 The word "multinational" as used here only denotes the existence of manufacturing
operations, owned to significant extent by the parent firm, in numerous countries.
11
 Company annual reports and documents.
12
 Manufacturing operations were counted as belonging to a particular European com-
pany if they were 25 per cent or more owned by it. Source: Tabulation done by the
author from company reports and partly reported in L. G. Franko, "Multinational Corpora-
tions in the 1970's: Will They Matter?" in P. Uri, ed., Trade and Investment Policies for
the 1970's (New York, 1971).
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TABLE 1
MULTINATIONALITY OF EUROPEAN ENTERPRISE, 1970
( DISTRIBUTION OF THE 81 LARGEST CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN
MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISES BY MAIN INDUSTRY OF PRODUCTION
AND BY EXTENT OR FOREIGN MANUFACTURE, 1970)
SIC
No.
20
24-27
28
284
29
299
30
32
331
333
35
361-2
363-9
37
Main Industry
of Firm ( • )
Food and Beverages
Wood, Paper and Printing
products
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals
Soaps and Toiletries
Petroleum
Coal products
Rubber
Glass
Primary Ferrous Metals
Primary non-Ferrous Metals
Non-Electrical Machinery
Industrial Electrical
Machinery
Consumer Electrical and
Electronic products
Transportation equipment
Total
Number of
Firms In
Sample
2
3
14
1
6
1
3
2
15
7
7
6
4
10
81
Number of Firms
with Manufactur-
ing Operations
in 7 or more
Countries at End
of 1970 C " )
2
2
14
1
6
0
3
2
6
5
5
6
4
6
62
(°) Defined as the indicated Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC) industry in
which firms had the largest portion of their sales.
(*o) Firms were counted as having manufacturing operations in a given country only
if they owned 25 per cent or more of a manufacturing subsidiary in it.
Many continental European companies have been active in in-
ternational manufacturing for a very long time. A significant num-
ber of today's major European chemical, pharmaceutical, electrical
equipment, and food companies had some manufacturing outside
their home countries by World War I.13
The earliest pioneers are cited in Table 2. Out of a total of
seventeen, nine were German. By and large, when they undertook
foreign manufacturing, they did so in other European countries.
Eight were based in the chemical industry, and four produced elec-
13
 Information in the Comparative Multinational Enterprise Data Bank, Harvard Busi-
ness School; see also sources for Table 2.
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trical equipment. European multinational enterprise was beginning
to emerge at least as early as the American variety.14
During the inter-war period, these international enterprises were
in turn joined by others. Dutch, Swiss, and Swedish newcomers
such as Philips, Margarine Uni, Alusuisse, and Swedish Match were
perhaps the most prominent additions in those years. A number of
inveterate German internationalizers (I. G. Farben, Bosch, Siemens,
and AEG) were stubbornly reconstituting the foreign outposts lost
in World War I. They were to do so once again after their foreign
manufacturing subsidiaries had again been confiscated during
World War II.
The major expansion in the number of European companies with
significant multinational operations, to be sure, occurred in the post-
World War II era. Despite early efforts such as Renault's estab-
lishment of two assembly plants in Russia in 1914, Europe's auto-
mobile companies were to have significant international manufac-
turing activities only after 1946.15 Anglo-Dutch Shell excepted,
continental European petroleum companies with important inter-
national operations emerged only during the 1950s. In sectors such
as electrical and non-electrical machinery, the few firms with lengthy
international experience, such as Siemens, AEG, and Bosch of
Germany were joined by a host of newcomers, including Thomson-
Brandt of France and Olivetti of Italy. Nevertheless, neither the
state nor the process of multinationality are unusual for European
enterprise.
PROLIFERATION OF FOREIGN MANUFACTURING SUBSIDIARIES
The spread of foreign manufacturing by the large firms of con-
tinental Europe has, however, been anything but gradual. If a
look at the numbers of parent firms with international operations
could convey an impression of a smooth European expansion into
multinationality, a quite different picture is painted by the record
of foreign subsidiaries set up or acquired. Table 3 suggests that
the numbers of entries into subsidiaries by continental parents have
alternately expanded very rapidly or stagnated. The number of
foreign manufacturing outposts of continental firms proliferated
just before and just after World War I. The next great spurt did
14
 On the pre-World War I U.S. multinational company expansion, see Mira Wilkins,
The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), especially 212 and
213.
15
 Patrick Fridenson, Histoire des Vsines Renault (Paris, 1972), 66. One of Re-
nault's factories was located in Petrograd (later Leningrad).
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not occur until the late 1960s, as is shown in Table 3. This was
quite a different evolution from the continually increasing expan-
sion of U.S. company subsidiaries documented in the same table.
TABLE 3
ENTRY INTO FOREIGN MANUFACTURING: COMPARATIVE HISTORIES OF
U.S., BRITISH, CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE ENTERPRISE
Numbers of Foreign Manufacturing
Subsidiaries Entered by Parents from:
Continental
Period U.S.A. U.K. Europe Japan
Pre-1914
1914-1919
1920-1929
1930-1938
1939-1945
1946-1952
1953-1955
1956-1958
1959-1961
1962-1964
1965-1967
1968-1970
122
71
299
315
172
386
283
439
901
959
889
n.a.
60
27
118
99
34
202
55
94
333
319
459
729
167
51
249
112
44
129
117
131
232
229
532
1,030
0
0
1
3
40
2
5
14
44
90
113
209
Notes: Data on subsidiaries of U.K., continental European, and Japanese-based firms
were collected for all 200 parent firms on the 1971 Fortune "200" list of non-U.S. in-
dustrial enterprises, as well as for a few financial holding companies and family groups
that had more than $400,000,000 of sales in 1970 coming from manufacturing operations.
Data on subsidiaries of U.S.-based parents were collected for 187 U.S. firms on the 1968
Fortune "500" list with an equity interest of at least 25 per cent in manufacturing sub-
sidiaries in at least six foreign countries as of January 1, 1968. Some fifty of these U.S.
firms were smaller than the non-U.S. companies surveyed. A similar number of non-U.S.
firms do not manufacture in six or more foreign countries. Data incomparabilities thus
exist. They do not, however, seem critically to alter the order of magnitude indicated by
the above comparisons. For a fuller explanation of the data in the Comparative Multi-
national Enterprise Data Bank, see the Vaupel and Curhan book.
Source: James W. Vaupel and Joan P. Curhan, The Making of Multinational Enterprise
(Harvard Business School, Boston, 1973, and C. E. I., Geneva, 1974), Tables 1.17.2,
1.17.3, 1.17.4, and 1.17.5, pages 72-103.
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS AND EXPORTS
If the spread of European multinational company activity was
unique in its timing, most of it nonetheless had origins that ap-
peared to resemble those of U.S. multinational expansion in one
critical respect. Like their U.S. counterparts, continental Euro-
pean manufacturing firms almost always seem to have begun the
process of becoming multinational by exporting on the basis of
oligopolistic advantages in technological innovation.16 Yet, the
16
 As indicated above, the word innovation as used here signifies first commercial intro-
duction, not invention. European inventors often preceded American innovation, as Table
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kinds of oligopolistic innovations developed by Europe's nascent
multinationals tended to be quite unlike those first commercialized
in the U.S. market.
As in the case of U.S. exports that later led to multinational pro-
duction, it was innovation, or first commercial introduction, that
mattered, not first invention. European invention, that is to say,
discovery, often led neither to home nor export sales. On the con-
trary, European inventions were often transferred to the U.S. and
first applied there.17 The examples of penicillin, the computer, and
the integrated circuit are cases in point. Even within the Euro-
pean context, the same phenomenon could be observed, for ex-
ample in the invention of margarine in France followed by first
commercial introduction in Holland.18
Examples of the connection between continental European in-
novation, exports, and subsequent foreign production are numerous
and convincing, despite the fact that the link has not been rigor-
ously demonstrated. The history of synthetic dyestuffs is another
case in point. Table 2 above indicated that numerous foreign
manufacturing operations had been begun before 1914 by dyestuffs
firms such as Ciba, Geigy, BASF, Hoechst, Bayer, and Agfa. L. F.
Haber, H. Friedlander, and others have chronicled how, prior
to this multinational spread, the invention of synthetic dyestuffs
in England and France was followed not by English and French
exports, but rather by large-scale commercialization and process
and product development in Germany and Switzerland. Massive
exports, and then industrial implantation back into the countries
of invention later emanated from the innovating German and
Swiss enterprises.19 Something of the export phase of this sequence
4 points out. It was typically this innovative step that led to the rise of multinational
enterprise. The role of oligopolistic competitive advantage and market imperfection in
explaining the rise of multinational enterprise was first examined systematically in S.
Hymer, "The International Operations of National Firms: A Study of Direct Investment,"
(Doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1960). The importance of
oligopolistic imperfections based on technology in explaining the international spread of
U.S. enterprise has been the subject of a vast and growing literature. See inter alia: R.
Vernon, "International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle," Quar-
terly Journal of Economics (May> 1966), and the studies included and cited in L. T. Wells,
Jr., ed., The Product Life Cycle and International Trade (Boston, 1972). See also: A.
Harmann, The International Computer Industry (Cambridge, Mass., 1970); and Harvard
Business School, "The U.S. Automobile Industry in the World Market," Note ICR 530,
1971.
17
 No systematic study of the frequency or causes of the international transplant of
inventions appears to have been made. But examples of European inventions followed by
U.S. application are abundant enough. See David Landes, The Unbound Prometheus (Cam-
bridge, 1969); OECD, Gaps in Technology, Vols. I-V (Paris, 1971); J. Jewkes, et al..
The Sources of Invention (London, 1969).
18
 Charles Wilson, The History of Unilever (London, 1954) II, 25 and 26.
19
 L. F. Haber, The Chemical Industry in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1958); H.
Friedlander and J. Oser, Economic History of Modern Europe (New York, 1953), especial-
ly 243.
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prior to World War I can be glimpsed from Table 4 below. The
impression of a connection between innovation and exports be-
comes still stronger upon noting that synthetic dyestuffs exports
from firms in countries other than Germany and Switzerland were
virtually nil.20
TABLE 4
GROWTH OF THE SYNTHETIC DYESTUFF INDUSTRY
Quinquennia
Ending:
Dyestuff Patents
Granted in
England to:
German British
Number of
Employees
of the
"Badische
Anilin und
Inventors Inventors Sodafabrik"
Exports in Metric Tons:
Germany Switzerland
1860
1880
1900
1910
8
47
427
561
20
13
52
30
1,534
6,711
7,610
8,294
46,858
84,110
3,116
6,975
Source: Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, V, 302.
Innovative advantages also appeared intimately linked with the
extraordinary export successes of Germany's Siemens and AEG.
Some of their innovative advantages were indigenous, others
originated with exclusive European licenses from U.S. companies
for the production of electric lights, automatic telephone exchange,
and the like. On the eve of World War I, Germany accounted for
over 48 per cent of total world electrical exports.21 Indeed, Germany
remained the largest single exporting country for electrical equip-
ment until the outbreak of World War II.22 Exports of unique
goods, or goods produced with unique processes, preceded es-
sentially all the pre-World War II expansion by Siemens and AEG
into foreign manufacturing (noted in Table 2). Only one im-
portant exception appeared: Siemens quite unusually began the
production of telegraph cables and water meters in England in the
1850s — products the firm did not then manufacture at home.23
A link between innovation and export can be found in the his-
tories of virtually all the other parent firms prominent in the ex-
pansion of European multinationals before World War II. The
formation of Ivar Kreuger's Swedish Match empire in the 1920s
20
 Haber, Chemical Industry in the Nineteenth Century, 243.
21
 Friedlander and Oser, Economic History, 247.
22
 Georg Siemens, History of the House of Siemens (Freiburg and Munich, 1957), II.
"Ibid., I, 32ff.; AEG, 50 Jahre AEG (Berlin, 1956).
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followed a half century of Swedish exports based on innovations
in safety matches.24 Alusuisse had been the first firm formed to
exploit the Herault process for producing aluminum. It exported
aluminum for many years prior to entering significant foreign pro-
duction.25 I. G. Farben earned much foreign exchange for Weimar
and then for Nazi Germany by first spending up to 12.7 per cent
of its sales revenue (in 1927) on research and development in order
to secure innovative advantages.26 By 1908, Philips of Holland had
ceased simply imitating carbon filament electric lamps and export-
ing only on the basis of a price advantage secured through rela-
tively low cost labor. Development efforts underlay increasing
product and process singularity that in turn preceded Philips' major
moves into foreign manufacturing in the 1930s.27
After World War II much the same sort of sequence seemed
again in motion. The distinctive post-1945 European innovations
in autos, pharmaceuticals, plastics, and metalworking processes,
cited in Table 5, led first to exports, and only then to production
abroad. There were, however, some exceptions to the rule, and
perhaps the most notable were the petroleum companies started
and owned by governments in France and Italy.
Western Europe, as it again abruptly came to realize in the 1970s,
has never had the indigenous resources of petroleum that allowed
U.S. firms to develop innovative advantages in refining — let alone
exploration — comparatively quickly. Of the continental countries,
only Holland had oil-producing colonies during the first half of
the twentieth century. After the Russian Revolution eliminated for-
eign-owned firms from the Caucasus, Western European govern-
ments felt dependent on either Anglo-Saxon companies (and on
the partly British Royal Dutch Shell) or the Soviet government for
their oil supply. Some were content with neither choice. One re-
sult was what the historian of the Compagnie Frangaise des Petroles
refers to, in jest, as the "immaculate conception" of that firm out
of the debris of World War I.28 The company was formed at the
initiative of the French government to administer that part of the
Turkish Petroleum Company (later the Iraq Petroleum Company)
24
 Friedlander and Oser, Economic History, 417.
25
 D. H. Wallace, Market Control in the Aluminum Industry (Cambridge, Mass., 1937),
6, 33, 34.
28
 H. Gross, Further Facts and Figures on I. G. Farben (Kiel, 1950), 12.
27
 N. V. Philips, Facts About Philips (Eindhoven, 1970), 3-8; P. J. Bouman, Anton
Philips of Eindhoven (London, 1958), 48, mentions Philips' original low wage competitive
advantage. The book subsequently describes its move toward its own proprietary tech-
nology.
28
 Jean Rondot, La Compagnie Francaise des Pitroles (Paris, 1962), 5.
EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS 287
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.2307/3112950
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 10 Jul 2017 at 16:17:17, subject to the
I z m a C/3
T
A
BL
E 
5
SO
M
E 
EU
R
O
PE
A
N
 
IN
N
O
VA
TI
O
NS
 
LE
A
D
IN
G
 
TO
 
TH
E 
R
IS
E 
O
F 
M
U
LT
IN
A
TI
O
N
A
L 
EN
TE
R
PR
IS
E
Pr
od
uc
t 
o
r 
Pr
oc
es
s
Y
ea
r
Fi
rm
A
pp
ar
en
t 
M
ar
ke
t 
St
im
ul
us
A
m
m
on
ia
-S
od
a 
18
64
Pr
oc
es
s
A
liz
ar
in
 
18
70
A
m
m
on
ia
 
Sy
nt
he
sis
 
19
13
fo
r 
Fe
rti
liz
er
M
ar
ga
rin
e 
18
72
A
nt
i-S
yp
hi
lit
ic
 
19
10
D
ru
gs
 
(S
alv
ars
in)
Sy
nt
he
tic
 
R
ub
be
r 
19
30
's
Lo
w
 
Po
w
er
 
U
til
iz
at
io
n
 
19
30
's
fo
r 
A
lu
m
in
um
 
El
ec
-
 
to
tr
ol
ys
is 
19
60
's
V
ol
ks
w
ag
en
 
19
51
B
ee
tle
Po
ly
pr
op
yl
en
e 
19
57
So
lv
ay
(B
elg
ium
)
BA
SF
(G
erm
an
y)
BA
SF
(G
erm
an
y)
Ju
rg
en
s/
U
ni
-
le
ve
r 
(N
L)
H
oe
ch
st
(G
erm
an
y)
B
ay
er
/I.
 
G
.
 
Fa
rb
en
(G
erm
an
y)
Pe
ch
in
ey
(F
ran
ce
)
V
W (G
erm
an
y)
M
on
te
ca
tin
i
(It
aly
)
D
es
ire
 
to
 
re
du
ce
 
fu
el
 
n
ee
ds
,
 
el
im
in
at
e 
su
lp
hu
ric
 
ac
id
in
pu
ts 
an
d 
re
co
v
er
 
n
itr
og
en
-ri
ch
 
am
m
o
n
ia
.
D
es
ire
 
to
 
su
bs
tit
ut
e 
fo
r 
im
po
rts
 
of
 
n
at
ur
al
 
dy
es
 
fo
r
m
ili
ta
ry
 
u
n
ifo
rm
s 
pr
ev
io
us
ly
 
o
bt
ai
ne
d 
fro
m
 
Fr
an
ce
.
Sc
ar
ci
ty
 
of
 
ar
ab
le
 
la
nd
; 
in
to
le
ra
bl
e 
st
ra
te
gi
c
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 
o
n
 
Ch
ile
an
 
n
itr
at
es
.
Lo
w
-in
co
m
e,
 
m
as
s 
de
m
an
d.
 
H
ig
h 
pr
ic
e 
of
 
bu
tte
r.
Lo
w
-in
co
m
e,
 
m
as
s 
de
m
an
d 
gu
ar
an
te
ed
 
by
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
he
al
th
 
in
su
ra
nc
e.
M
ili
ta
ry
 
fe
ar
 
of
 
cu
to
ff 
fro
m
 
n
at
ur
al
 
ru
bb
er
 
su
pp
lie
s.
H
ig
h 
co
st
 
of
 
Fr
en
ch
 
el
ec
tri
ci
ty
.
Lo
w
-in
co
m
e,
 
m
as
s 
de
m
an
d.
D
es
ire
 
to
 
u
se
 
w
as
te
 
pr
od
uc
ts.
So
ur
ce
s:
 
As
 
lis
ted
 
fo
r 
Ta
bl
e 
6.
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.2307/3112950
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 10 Jul 2017 at 16:17:17, subject to the
awarded to France at the San Remo Diplomatic Conference as
part of the spoils of World War I.29 After oil was discovered, CFFs
British and American partners in IPC built a refinery in Iraq to
process the crude. Thus, politics (and a cash contribution) first
put the now multinationally active CFP into the business of both
foreign manufacturing (i.e., oil refining) and exporting refined
petroleum products. With the experience thus gained, and later
with a protected home market as well, such a government-instru-
ment firm could subsequently apply lessons learned in its hot-
house environment to foreign countries in the manner of a more
"spontaneously generated" multinational. Indeed, even if it never
developed marked oligopolistic technological advantages by this
process, such a firm could, and often did, offer a differentiated,
non-Anglo-Saxon "political" product.30
THE ROLE OF HOME MARKET CONDITIONING
More than "immaculate conceptions" have, however, set the story
of the spread of continental European multinational enterprise
apart. Early home market conditioning seems to have played a
considerable role. It is clear that the economic characteristics of
home markets in continental Europe were different from those
facing innovators in the U.S. Distinctive home markets appear to
have left their mark on Europe's nascent multinationals primarily
in terms of the kinds of product and process innovations they
developed. The frequency distribution of European innovations
eventually put into foreign production appears to have long been
biased toward material-saving processes, ersatz material substitutes,
and goods oriented toward low-income consumers. This tendency
is illustrated in Table 5. By way of contrast, the examples pre-
sented in Table 6 indicate that U.S. innovations were typically
skewed towards goods and processes that had an appeal to the
unique high-income, labor short American market.
CONDITIONING BY DIFFERENT INCOME LEVELS
Part of the explanation for differences between European and
American patterns of innovation doubtless lies in differences in
" Ibid., US.30
 ENI, the Italian state oil company in particular appears to have gained entry into
refining in various countries in Africa largely as a result of such political product differ-
entiation. See M. Tiger and L. G. Franko, E.N.I. (Geneva, 1973); P. Frankel, Mattei:
Oil and Power Politics (New York, 1966); Elena Chiado-Fiorio, II Caso ENI (Torino,
1973).
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absolute levels of income per capita. Average national income per
capita data for ten countries in 1914 are presented in Graph 1.
Graph 2 presents similar data for twenty-four of the world's 186
nations for 1959 and 1969. These tables show that the U.S. was
highest on the list for both 1914 and 1969. Moreover, the relative
rankings of income levels for the U.S., France, Germany, and Italy
did not change over this fifty-five-year span. Even changes in
proportional differences have not been great. U.S. per capita in-
come throughout the first half of the twentieth century was nearly
twice that of France and Germany, and roughly three times that of
Italy. Some nations have changed their relative positions for the
better (Japan) or worse (the U.K.), but the relationship between
the U.S. and the largest continental countries has remained rela-
tively stable.
International differences in income levels are important for in-
novative activity because consumers appear to behave as if they
have a hierarchy of needs varying with their income levels. Evi-
dence suggests that the order in which consumers acquire house-
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hold appliances is primarily a function of income, rather than of
broad cultural factors.31 Setting aside obvious differences due to
resource endowments, it also appears that there is an order of
acquisition of industrial goods that is followed fairly predictably
as a result of economic growth.32 By extension, one expects new
needs to emerge as incomes grow to previously unreached levels.
If scientific and technical skills are available, would-be innovators
will presumably respond to such new needs. Moreover, would-be
innovators located in a "first market" seem to have an enormous
advantage over those located outside it. It is they who will be
most conscious of the emergent market opportunity; it is they who
can most rapidly respond to customer wants and define concretely
a product that at first may be only a hazy, uncertain idea.33
Given the historical constants shown in Graphs 1 and 2, it is
understandable that the U.S. market long acted as midwife to the
development by U.S. companies of the time-saving, convenience
products that substituted for high-income, high-cost labor.34 The
31
 See, for example, Y. Parush, "The Order of Acquisition of Durable Goods," Bank
of Israel Bulletin (February, 1964).
33
 Such appears to be the implication of findings like those of Pong S. Lee, in "Struc-
tural Change in Rumanian Industry," Soviet Studies (October, 1968). Lee, following on
work of Chenery, shows that industrial structure varies much more with per capita income
and population size than with ideological systems.
33
 S. Hirsch, Location of Industry and International Competitiveness (London, 1967).
Vernon, "International Investment," 191-192.
34
 Vernon, "International Investment," 193; and Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay, Chapter 3.
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link between such product innovations and exporting is also rather
clear. Such products tended to be demanded in ever-increasing
quantities in Europe, as income levels continually moved up toward
the level prevailing previously in the U.S. What, however, would
be the case in continental European countries, where potential in-
novators have long had a level of scientific and technical ability
similar to that found in the highest income, U.S. market?35
A certain amount of product innovation designed to tap rising
consumer incomes appears to have occurred in the European con-
tinent in spite of the tendency of the U.S. to lead. Nestle's mothers'
milk substitute that allowed women to begin breaking away from
their traditional ties to Kinder, Kirche, Ktiche, was just the sort of
product one might have expected to be a U.S. innovation in the
1890s but was Swiss instead.38 And in at least one case, that of
the Compagnie de Saint Gobain, a European firm obtained an in-
novative lead in income-elastic mirrors and glass in the early 1700s,
well before the U.S. existed as a nation.37
(Still other European innovators seem to have directed their ac-
tivity toward applying new processes to American-type, high in-
come products. A number of observers have commented on the
seeming tendency of American companies to innovate new prod-
ucts, whereas European firms tended to introduce new manufactur-
ing processes.38 The available data are too fragmentary to show
whether such a clear dichotomy between U.S. and European in-
novation existed. Nevertheless, examples suggest that process in-
novation was a major European theme. Philips of Holland and
AEG of Germany even began life as independent entities in the
1890s by innovating processes for the production of Edison's prod-
uct, the electric lamp.39
Nevertheless, most innovative activity undertaken on the Con-
tinent appears to have been oriented to ends other than time-
saving products or processes for producing them. Distinctive pat-
terns of distribution of income around the average per capita levels
presented in Graphs 1 and 2 gave European innovators one set of
unique stimuli. Patterns of relative factor costs that long diverged
35
 It is generally agreed that there is little or no scientific gap among the countries under
consideration here. The supply of technical ability does not seem to have been a significant
constraint on innovation. See OECD, Gaps in Technology, various reports (Paris, 1971).
39
 J. Heer, Reflets du monde, presence de NestU (Rivaz, 1966).
«J. Choffel, S*. Gobain, du miroir d Vatome (Paris, 1960).38
 This finding has been documented for the steel industry in Roger Emile Miller, In-
novation, Organization and Environment: A Study of Sixteen American and West Euro-
pean Steel Firms (University Catholique de Louvain, Belgique, Nouvelles Series, No. 86),
152.
38
 Philips, Facts About Philips, 4-8.
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from those prevailing in the U.S. provided another. In the history
of European innovation, these factors more than others appear to
underlie the recurring emphasis on material-saving processes and
substitutes and products designed for consumers with lower in-
comes than those prevailing in the U.S.
INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND COMPARATIVE INNOVATION
Over long periods of time, the pattern of distribution of personal
income in most European countries has been notably unlike that
prevailing in the U.S. Sociologists, historians, and business writers
have often referred to the U.S. as a middle-class society.40 Euro-
pean countries, particularly the large continental countries, have
often been described as societies composed of aristocratic and semi-
aristocratic elites on the one hand and peasants and workers on
the other — without terribly many people in between.41 Table 7
suggests that such generalizations must be made with considerable
care, and with attention to variations among European countries
and among historical periods. In 1936, the middle classes in Nazi
Germany were receiving a somewhat higher percentage of total per-
sonal income than the middle classes in the U.S., although contrasts
were still in evidence at the high and low income levels. In the
1960s, Sweden, the Netherlands, the U.S., and also the U.K., came
to have broadly similar income distribution patterns: in these coun-
tries similar percentages of total income went to the lowest 40, the
upper-middle 40 and the top 20 per cent of their populations.
Nevertheless, clear contrasts between the U.S. and the largest
European countries emerge from Table 7.42 Moreover, one is struck
40
 See J. Fayerweather, International Marketing (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965), 32.
D. Krech, et al., Individual in Society: A Textbook of Social Psychology (New York, 1962),
304-316.
41
 See Landes, Unbound Prometheus 48, 129, and 131 for such characterizations concern-
ing the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy
in Germany (London, 1968), especially Chapter 6 for a recent characterization of this
sort.
42
 The data presented in Table 7 are clearly imperfect. Different natural propensities
in tax evasion and income declaration are but two of the many sources of potential error
mentioned in the sources for that table. These data do not adjust for the effect on market
demand of direct or indirect, progressive or regressive tax systems, nor do they account
for government social security, insurance, and transfer payments. It is worth noting, how-
ever, that the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the source for many of
the figures cited in Table 7, argues that after-tax and transfer payment adjustments do not
have a major effect on the distribution patterns derived from before-tax data in the three
countries for which estimates can be made: the U.K., Germany, and Norway. (Economic
Commission for Europe, Incomes in Postwar Europe, Chapter 6.) The likely effect of
such adjustments, could they but be made, would, of course, very likely accentuate the
already favorable position of the lowest 10 per cent of European populations relative to
that of the U.S. As tax evasion and underreporting of income tends to be a privilege of
the rich, one might expect either a neutral effect across countries, or, if it is true that such
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TABLE 7
DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILY PERSONAL INCOME IN EUROPE AND THE U.S.
( PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL INCOME BEFORE
TAX RECEIVED BY INDICATED FRACTION OF FAMILIES )
Fraction of Families
Lowest Fortieth Highest Highest
Lowest to
Two Eightieth
Country & Year Tenth Fifths Percentile Fifth Tenth
ABOUT
US 1918
Germany 1913
US 1935-6
UK 1929
Germany 1936
Sweden 1935
Netherlands 1938
US 1950
UK 1949
Germany 1950
Sweden 1948
Netherlands 1950
US 1969
UK 1964
Germany 1964
France 1962
Sweden 1963
Netherlands 1962
2
3.5
THE TIME O F '
% 18 %
18
WORLD WAR
36 %
27
DURING THE INTER-WAR PERIOD
n.a.
3
1
n.a.
n.a.
n.a
1
n.a,
1.3
1
2
2.1
0.5
1.6
1.3
12.7
18
11
n.a.
n.a.
34.1
31
36
n.a.
n.a.
AROUND 1950
15.8
17
12.5
12.8
13.8
DURING THE
15
15.3
15.4
9.5
14
14
38.5
35.5
39.5
40.6
37.2
1960s
40
40.5
31.7
36.8
42
37.6
I
46 %
55
53.2
51
53
58.1
52.5
45.7
47.5
48
46.6
49
45
44.2
52.9
53.7
44
48.4
34 %
41
36
41
39
39-5
38.7
30.3
33
34
30.3
35
27
29.3
41.4
36.8
27.9
33.8
Note: The percentages for the fortieth to eightieth percentiles are highlighted to call
attention to the fraction of incomes received by what most observers might be inclined to
refer to as the "middle-class."
Sources: For the U.S. in 1918: Wesley C. Mitchell and others, Income in the United
States: Its Amount and Distribution, 1909-1919 (1921), I, 141. For Germany in 1913,
the U.K. in 1929, and the U.S. in 1935-1936: W. S. and E. S. Woytinsky, World Popu-
lation and Production (New York, 1953), 409, 407. For Germany, Sweden, and the
Netherlands in the 1930s, and for the U.K., Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands in
the 1940s and in 1950: United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Economic
Survey of Europe in 1956 (Geneva, 1957), chapter IX, 6. For the U.S. in 1950 and
1969: U.S., Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1971
(Washington, 1972), Table 504, p. 317. For European countries in the 1960s: United
Nations, Economic Survey of Europe in 1965, Part 2: Incomes in Postwar Europe — A
Study of Policies, Growth and Distribution (Geneva, 1967), chapter 6, p. 15.
activities are rather more European than American hobbies, they would once again merely
emphasize the contrasts to which Table 7 points.
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by the persistence of the basic patterns. The resemblance between
the German and U.S. distributions of 1964 and those of 1913 is a
case in point.43
These contrasts in income distribution made the home environ-
ments in which European multinationals were bom clearly different
from that which nurtured U.S. multinational enterprise. Where
markets diverged, innovations were introduced accordingly, and
distinctive oligopolistic strengths were developed. As the history
of the auto industry was to show, European companies tended to
introduce either luxury products or near-necessities for the masses.
U.S. firms were pulled toward satisfying middle and upper-middle
income needs.44
Daimler and Benz first marketed workable automobiles in Ger-
many in 1888 and 1886. Conditioned then and later by their home
market demand, "the German manufacturers concentrated on lux-
ury cars, since the German middle class was not large enough to
support the scale needed for the innovation and manufacture of
an inexpensive automobile." 4B For French auto manufacturers be-
fore World War I, the market demand was much the same. One
examination of the market for automobiles between 1899 and 1928
in the French Departement of Indre-et-Loire led to the conclusion
that "the demand for private automobiles comes principally from
the group comprising people of independent means, noblemen and
large land-owners."40 A government report in 1917 went even
further. It argued that past successes meant that the orientation of
the French industry to luxury demands ought to be elevated to
the level of doctrine: "It is the luxury article that has given birth
to our worldwide reputation. . . . we must defend this patrimony
. . . it is this that has led to the development of our automobile
industry. . . . purity and harmony of form, even more than luxury
43
 Dr. Emilio Fontela and others of the Batelle Institute in Geneva, Switzerland have
published a number of discussions of income distribution in Europe in which cogent argu-
ments are presented for the existence of a relationship between increases in average per
capita incomes and moves toward the U.S. type of income distribution. Their hypothesis
is that as economic growth proceeds, markets of masses-plus-aristocrats will be replaced
by markets in which a middle class, itself having a wide range of incomes, will constitute
the dominant market segment. The long-term data presented in Table 7 provide little evi-
dence in favor of such a hypothesis. See H. L. Dotti and Emilio Fontela, "Distribution
des revenues et integration de l'Europe," Revue du MarchS Commun (Janvier, 1970).
44
 For brief but comprehensive summaries of the history of the auto industry, see B.
McKern, "The U.S. Automobile Industry in the World Market," in R. Vernon, Manager
in the International Economy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1972); L. T. Wells, Jr., "National
Policies in International Industry: The Europeans and the Automobile," forthcoming in R.
Vernon, ed., Big Business and Governments in Europe (Cambridge, Mass., 1974).
« Wells, "National Policies," 4.
46
 Fridenson, Histoire des Usines Renault, 21.
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manufacture, must be one of the primordial elements of the mainte-
nance of our supremacy."47
It was not until the automobile was uprooted from Europe, in
the manner of the jet engine, the computer, penicillin, the aerosol
can, the continuous strip mill, and other inventions, that it was intro-
duced into the huge U.S. market. By accident rather than design,
the low price (then) middle class U.S. market was discovered
when one of the factories of Ransom Olds burned down. The only
car he could produce was the least expensive of his line. The de-
mand turned out to be enormous. When Olds was unable to fi-
nance the expansion of the Oldsmobile, Ford stepped in with the
mass-produced Model T in 1908 and the moving assembly line in
1914.48 It was during these years that U.S. production and ex-
ports outstripped those of Germany and France.49 But France and
Germany were exceeded in products that had little else but the name
"automobile" in common.
Much later, in 1970, continental European auto production was
once again to equal that of the Americans.50 In addition, Europe's
auto exports in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were to be vastly greater
than those of America.51 The oligopolistic advantages that underlay
these developments, however, had much to do with mass markets
consisting largely of customers with incomes still lower than those
that had tempted American producers. In 1946, following nation-
alization, Renault introduced its low price R-4.52 Then came
Citroen's 2-CV.53 Shortly thereafter came the market introduction
of Germany's Volkswagen.54 Automobiles all, but of a very differ-
ent sort than those which set U.S. manufacturers on the path to
multinationality. Indeed, it was not until the late 1960s that the
introduction of Citroen's GX and Volkswagen's Audi gave hints
that perhaps broad middle-class markets were beginning to become
significant on the Continent.
Developments in other industries, it appears, often paralleled
European-U.S. contrasts in automobiles. The comparatively fa-
vorable income position of the lowest classes plus the introduction
of social insurance legislation as early as the 1880s meant that
European (and particularly German) companies were to lead in
" Ibid., 37.
« McKem, "U.S. Automobile Industry," 433.
»Ibid., 435.
MU.N., Statistical Yearbook, 1971 (New York, 1972).
61
 McKem, "U.S. Automobile Industry," 443.
62
 Wells, "National Policies," 13.
63
 Ibid.
"Ibid., 10.
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basic pharmaceuticals.85 As a recent study noted, "Germany was
not alone in having the technology to translate a laboratory syn-
thesis into a full-scale operating production operations. Both
England and France had strong chemical industries, capable of
producing what was discovered in Germany. The missing ingre-
dient [in these former countries] was demand."56 Important U.S.
pharmaceutical companies emerged only after World War II.
They then made their distinctive contribution in antibiotics and
psychopharmaceuticals. These U.S. innovations apparently reduced
hospitalization time, but they were probably less important than
aspirin, novocaine, and entero-vioform for stomach upsets — all in-
troduced in Europe by Bayer, Hoechst, and Ciba before World
War I.57
The phenomenon of European, and especially Italian, specializa-
tion in small household appliances and American company domi-
nance in large models also seems related to differences in income
distribution, as well as to those in income levels.58 Although the
companies that produce timepieces are too small to be among those
systematically included in this study, the split in the world watch
industry between Swiss producers of luxury goods and U.S. middle
class, mass merchandisers, seems another variation on the auto in-
dustry theme.59
RELATIVE FACTOR COSTS AND INNOVATION
Perhaps, however, the distinctive histories of European and
American commercial innovation have been most conditioned by
persistent international differences in the relationship between labor
costs and the costs of other production inputs. The most obvious
transatlantic contrast has been in comparative ratios of labor to raw-
material costs. Quantitative and impressionistic historical sources
are in accord. Save for partial exceptions such as resource-endowed
m
 L. Wortzel, "The Pharmaceutical Industry Study: An Overview," unpublished ms.,
presented at a conference sponsored by the Agnelli Foundation in Turin, Italy on the
Comparative Multinational Enterprise Project, June, 1971.56
 Ibid., 11.G7
 Haber, Chemical Industry In the Nineteenth Century.
68
 L. T. Wells, Jr., "Test of a Product Cycle Model of International Trade: U.S. Exports
of Consumer Durables/' Quarterly Journal of Economics (February, 1969).59
 Harvard Business School, "Note on the Watch Industries in Switzerland, Japan and
the United States," 1972. Dotti and Fontela, "Distribution," point out that income level
and distribution differences among nations will lead to differences in market demand struc-
ture across industries as well as within industries. These factors may explain, for example,
why there have been so few innovations, large firms, or multinational firms in food pro-
cessing arising on the European continent. As yet, the hypothesis has not been systematically
tested.
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Sweden and colonial Belgium, European entrepreneurs have faced
the cost consequences of a relative scarcity of land and raw ma-
terials. U.S. entrepreneurs have been, and remain, faced with an
environment in which labor commands a relative premium because
of its scarcity.
Table 8 presents quantitative estimates of these differences in
relative costs for the years 1913, 1929, 1950, 1963, and 1971. The
estimates are crude, but the orders of magnitude shown are in
broad accord with what qualitative sources tell us of differences
among countries and in different periods of time.
TABLE 8
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF RATIOS OF
RAW MATERIAL TO LABOR COSTS, 1914-1971
( A P P R O X I M A T E RELATIVE COST O F O N E ARBITRARY U N I T O F R A W M A -
TERIAL TO THE COST OF ONE HOUR OF LABOR WITH THE U.S . RATIO OF
MATERIAL TO LABOR COSTS TAKEN AS 100. )
U.S.A.
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Sweden
Switzerland
1913
100
194
294
158
1929
100
136
180
356
524
224
144
144
1950
100
176
448
290
502
420
113
181
1963
100
330
460
290
460
370
180
210
1971
100
263
364
190
345
251
139
182
Method of Calculation:
Historical information concerning prices paid for raw materials by entrepreneurs with-
in national markets is difficult or impossible to obtain. Price series, such as they are, tend
to be based on public quotations on international markets, like the London Metal Ex-
change. Thus, they were not useful for our purposes. National indices of raw materials
prices, however, were readily available, as were indices and values for wage rates. If one
assumed that in any given year, a relatively open, one-price international market in raw
materials prevailed, it then became possible to derive indicators of earlier or subsequent
divergences in relative factor cost ratios based on domestic price indices. In this table, it
is assumed that 1963 was such a year, and that raw materials' prices were identical in
all markets. Wage and price series were first put on a comparable 1963 = 100 basis.
Wage indices were then adjusted to reflect differences in wage levels among countries in
1963, i.e., since the Swedish average wage rate was equal to 57 per cent of that in the
U.S. in that year, the whole Swedish series was adjusted in proportion to this difference.
This meant that the Swedish index was shifted 43 per cent lower to reflect absolute U.S.-
Swedish differences. It did not mean that the margin between Swedish and U.S. revised
indices was ever at 100:57 in any year other than 1963. Once this adjustment was made,
wage and raw materials' price indices could be treated as if they were money-price series.
One arbitrary unit of raw materials could be said to cost whatever one average hour of
labor cost in the U.S. in 1963. National materials "cost series" were divided by the adjusted
labor cost series and the resulting ratios proportioned to the base of U.S. = 100 shown in
the table.
Sources: U.N., Statistical Yearbook, various issues, for 1929-1971 data on hourly earn-
ings and raw material costs. International Labor Organization, Year Book of Labor Statis-
tics, various issues.
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Throughout the twentieth century, indeed from its earliest days
as a nation, the U.S. had comparatively little labor relative to its
abundant land and material resources.60 Prior to World War I,
neither the slave trade nor successive waves of immigration seemed
to make much of a dent in this fact of life facing the U.S. entre-
preneur.61 With the passage of restrictive immigration laws in
1917, 1921, and 1924, the relative scarcity of labor was aggravated
even further.62
In Europe, and particularly on the Continent, labor was long in
substantial surplus.63 From the mid-1800s to the 1960s, most of
Europe worried about what to do with its reserve army of the un-
employed. The scarce resources in Europe were neither hands nor
brains — they were raw materials. This scarcity was sometimes
relieved by trade or oolonial expansion, but the fundamental,
autarkic reflexes first nurtured by Colbert under Louis XIV in the
seventeenth century continually re-asserted themselves as successive
European governments declared their dependence on foreign sup-
ply to be politically and militarily intolerable. The result was a
concern for substitution, and saving, of raw materials that recurred
again and again in European history. Innovation of synthetic
nitrogenous fertilizers, dyestuffs, rubber, and artificial silk, or rayon,
constituted one sort of response to the stimuli provided in such
markets. Products and processes that saved fuel were another. Euro-
pean firms, for example, pioneered in high efficiency auto engines,
electric furnaces, and fuel injection apparatus, as well as in indus-
trial processes such as that of Solvay for soda-ash, and of Pechiney
for producing aluminum with high-cost electricity. Similar examples
abound in the history of relative factor costs conditions in Europe
and their relation to innovations.64
CONCLUSIONS
Much remains to be done in the study of European multinational
manufacturing before a complete picture can emerge. One area
that needs to be explored, for example, concerns the contrasts be-
tween American and European firms' motivations for switching
fl0
 H. J. Habakkuk, American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century (Lon-
don, 1962), especially chapter 3.
61
 "Immigration Law," Encyclopaedia Britannica (New York, 1973), 1106ft.
«
2
 Ibid., 126-131.63
 See, for example, A. V. Desai, Real Wages in Germany 1871-1913 (London, 1968),
43.
6i
 For more details, see Chapter II of the author's forthcoming book, The Other Multi-
nationals: The International Firms of Continental Europe, 1870-1970.
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from exporting to foreign manufacturing. This is all the more so
since tariffs and other trade restrictions like exchange controls,
quantitative quotas, patent-working regulations, and subsidies ap-
pear to have been the primary influence on the decisions of Euro-
pean firms to manufacture in, rather than export to, foreign markets.
Such government-imposed restrictions often triggered foreign pro-
duction of the material-saving innovations emphasized above. Gov-
ernment measures appear to have been much less important in the
spread of foreign manufacturing of the income-elastic products
carried forth by American multinational enterprise. The lenient
attitude long held in Europe toward cartels, mergers, and other pri-
vate agreements also seems to have affected the amount and form
of foreign activity by continental firms. Points of similarity be-
tween the American and European multinational spread, may, how-
ever, exist in the history of the internationalization of production of
Europe's low-income mass products, such as autos and pharmaceuti-
cals, into the less developed world. These and other factors re-
quire examination before we can arrive at a comprehensive treat-
ment of the multinational firms of continental Europe, but they
cannot be considered in detail here.65
The present paper has sought to contribute to an understanding
of the origins of the multinational manufacturing enterprises based
on the European continent. Those enterprises followed a different
path of development from that pursued by United States firms, but
European multinational manufacturing began even earlier than did
American, and its story is no less significant. Beginning with
Cockerill's 1815 plant in Prussia, European companies engaged in
important manufacturing activity, mostly in other European nations.
Rather than the relatively even pattern of the spread of United
States enterprises abroad, European firms tended to expand in
spurts and then to undergo periods of stagnation. They were es-
pecially active in the years just before and after World War I, and
in the post-World War II period.
Throughout a century and a half of multinational production,
European companies followed several basic patterns. In most cases,
a firm would innovate a product or process (usually the latter),
thereby securing an oligopolistic advantage which it would initially
exploit by marketing in other countries and would finally end up
manufacturing inside those countries. The particular kinds of
products and processes innovated by European multinationals tend-
65
 More analysis and data will be contained in the author's forthcoming book, The
Other Multinationals.
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ed to be influenced by the distinctive nature of income levels and
income distribution in their home markets, and by the relative fac-
tor costs. Europe's evolution of a luxury market side-by-side with
a large lower class market, and its historical lack of a large middle
class market like the United States, was of major significance.
Similarly, the abundance of labor and the shortage of raw ma-
terials in the western part of the European continent played a large
role in shaping patterns of product and process development. The
result of such factors was an evolutionary pattern distinct from the
United States experience in many ways but rich in its own lessons
about the history of multinational enterprise in the modern world.
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